The advantages of demographic change after the wave: Fewer and older, but healthier, greener, and more productive? by Kluge, F. et al.
The Advantages of Demographic Change after the Wave:
Fewer and Older, but Healthier, Greener, and More
Productive?
Fanny Kluge1*, Emilio Zagheni2, Elke Loichinger3,4, Tobias Vogt1
1 Laboratory of Survival and Longevity, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, 2Department of Sociology, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington, United States of America, 3 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 4 Research Institute for Human Capital and Development,
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria
Abstract
Population aging is an inevitable global demographic process. Most of the literature on the consequences of demographic
change focuses on the economic and societal challenges that we will face as people live longer and have fewer children. In
this paper, we (a) briefly describe key trends and projections of the magnitude and speed of population aging; (b) discuss
the economic, social, and environmental consequences of population aging; and (c) investigate some of the opportunities
that aging societies create. We use Germany as a case study. However, the general insights that we obtain can be
generalized to other developed countries. We argue that there may be positive unintended side effects of population aging
that can be leveraged to address pressing environmental problems and issues of gender inequality and intergenerational
ties.
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Introduction
Countries around the globe are experiencing population aging.
In developed societies, life expectancy has risen at a steady pace of
about three months per year, and this trend is not expected to end
[1]. At the same time, fertility fell considerably in almost all
countries around the world. In Europe, three-quarters of the
population live in countries with fertility below the replacement
level [2]. Increasing longevity and low birth rates inevitably result
in major changes in the observed age structure, with consequences
for societal arrangements. The projected changes will affect
numerous areas of life, such as family formation, labor market
arrangements, the sustainability of public finances, and the
environment.
Economic research has so far primarily stressed the negative
effects of increasing life expectancy and declining fertility, such as
the burden of increasing dependency ratios [3,4], the dramatic
effects on the labor market [5–8], and the effects of global aging on
the macroeconomy [9,10]. Furthermore, a big branch of the
literature focuses on the impact of population aging on the pillars
of social security. According to numerous studies, health expen-
ditures are going to increase [11–14], as are expenditures for long-
term care [15,16]. Conversely, other studies find that population
aging contributes little to the escalation of health care costs
[17,18]. The increasing share of public pension expenditures of
government budgets is also of great concern [19–22]. The
observed and expected changes in the demographic composition
are projected to cause different problems in different countries,
depending mainly on the degree of reliance of the citizens on the
public sector in old age and the generosity of public programs.
For most European countries, the most dramatic changes are
expected to occur over the next three decades, during which a
decreasing number of producers will have to care for an increasing
number of consumers. After this transitional period, the popula-
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tions of these countries will, on average, be older and smaller; and
the costs will be lower as smaller cohorts start entering retirement
age. Therefore, while it is certainly true that the current and
expected changes in age structure will have a negative impact on,
for example, public finances, in the medium term, we expect to see
much milder consequences in the long run. In fact, there are a
number of ways in which population aging could represent an
opportunity. We investigate five areas that can illustrate possible
unintended positive consequences of population aging in the long
run. We focus on the educational composition of the labor force,
CO2 emissions in aging societies, intergenerational transfers in the
form of bequests, developments in care need and healthy life
expectancy, and the share of the lifetime spent working. These five
examples demonstrate the potential positive long-term effects that
are either directly or indirectly caused by population aging.
Examples of direct consequences are lower CO2 emissions due to
changing consumption patterns over the life cycle, and more
balanced intergenerational transfers as the upward public transfers
for public pensions are compensated for through higher inter-vivo
transfers and bequests due to the lower number of siblings. An
example of indirect consequences of population aging is the likely
change in composition of the labor force due to the expected
changes in the education structure.
Our study demonstrates the positive effects if the current
conditions prevail. However, this is not necessarily the case: There
will be some degree of behavioral adaptations of individuals, i.e.,
the findings are subject to change related to how far individuals in
the future make decisions that deviate from the currently observed
patterns. While it would be possible to speculate about the
different coping strategies that may be implemented in the future,
making such predictions is beyond the scope of this article.
However, our results will give some indication of the potential
magnitudes of expected effects. Hence, we intend to offer some
basis for discussion about the possible advantages of population
aging and how key age-dependent patterns could lead to changes
that will entail important societal adjustments.
We mainly focus on Germany, not only because the country is a
forerunner in terms of aging, but also because it has a very high
level of public transfers and a huge industrial sector. These
characteristics make Germany highly suitable for the envisaged
analysis. The article is structured as follows: We first provide an
overview of the population aging process in Germany. We then
present five illustrative examples of areas in which aging might
have advantageous side effects. In the remainder of the paper, we
show why these developments can be important for policy-makers,
and provide a concluding discussion.
Aging in Germany
We begin our analysis by presenting some descriptive figures on
population aging in Germany. Our intention is to show that major
demographic changes have happened in the past, and that
ongoing changes are expected to shape the future until 2040. The
main reason for these developments is the fact that the baby
boomer cohorts are reaching retirement age. When this influential
transition phase – which is expected to put pressure on social
security programs and create more general sustainability issues –
has passed, a more ‘‘advantageous’’ population age distribution
can be expected. Figure 1 compares the population age distribu-
tions for Germany in 2010 and 2060. While today individuals of
working age represent the majority of the population, these
cohorts will grow old in the coming decades. Thereafter, we can
expect to see an older but more evenly distributed age structure.
Germany is at an advanced stage in the demographic transition
for two main reasons: an early fertility decline and a rapidly
increasing life expectancy. The TFR had already fallen far below
the replacement level in the early 1970s and even today remains at
around 1.4. At the same time, life expectancy is expected to
increase further. In the medium-scenario UN projection, women
are predicted to gain another 10 years of life expectancy over the
course of the century. By 2060, female life expectancy at birth is
expected to reach 90 years [23].
Already today, Germany’s population has the second highest
median age worldwide (44.3 years) only topped by Japan’s median
age of 44.9 years [24]. This makes Germany a forerunner in terms
of aging, with a very steep rise in the old-age dependency ratio set
to occur between 2020 and 2040. The economic support ratio
shows an even more refined picture, as it considers the real
dependencies, and is, for example, used to calculate demographic
dividends [25]. In this case SR(t) = L(t)/N(t) where L(t) is the
population weighted by age-specific variation in productivity and
N(t) is the population weighted by the variation by age in
consumption. To calculate the support ratio, we use data on age-
specific consumption and income patterns from the National
Transfer Accounts project (see www.ntaccounts.org) to estimate
the real consumption and income values for the population over
the coming decades. The support ratio shows that, currently,
about 0.8 producers take care of one consumer. In the decades to
come, this ratio will fall to 0.6. Thus, Germany is an important
case to study, as it is among the first of the countries that will
experience a demographic future which almost all of the
industrialized countries will eventually face.
As Germany likely faces a continuously low level of TFR and
parallel increases in life expectancy, the aging process will occur at
a rapid pace, which as stated earlier will lead to sustainability
problems. While this is certainly the case in specific areas and for
some transitional decades, we can expect the demographic
changes to be moderate after 2050. We have identified important
areas in which population aging can be even advantageous. These
areas will be presented in the remaining sections of the paper.
Methods
We use various methods to show the likely advantageous effects
of population aging in selected areas, but we will not describe these
methods in detail here. Instead, at the beginning of each section,
we will briefly present the data and methods used. The overall
approach for all of the sections is comparable: we will show the
underlying age patterns for each variable of interest, such as the
CO2 emissions or the education-specific labor force participation
level. This is intended to provide information on how age-sensitive
our variables are. We will then project the information. Our focus
is on a point in time relatively far in the future, when the
demographic turmoil is likely to be over, and a smaller population
with a less unbalanced age structure is anticipated. Our analysis
mainly investigates what will happen if the current conditions
prevail. We use age profiles of the monetary production and
consumption, environmental conditions, the labor market, health-
related conditions and time use variables observed today, and
combine these with medium-term population forecasts, to show
what happens to the results on the macro level if a different
population structure were assumed. This basic forecast can give us
important insights into how demography will alter the variables on
the population level; and whether we will encounter an
improvement in, for example, CO2 emissions after 2050, if only
because having an older population is, on average, associated with
lower consumption of energy-intensive goods.
The Advantages of Demographic Change
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Results
More productive? – Demographic change and the labor
force
Economic activity levels in Germany vary between age groups
and between men and women, and they show the typical inverted
u-shape: the level is higher for middle-aged individuals than for
younger and older people, and men are more likely to participate
in market work than women (the ‘‘total’’ line in Figure 2). In
addition to these known differences, there are also noticeable
differences in labor force participation levels – our measure of
economic activity – by individuals’ highest levels of educational
attainment. We created two distinct education categories: one that
includes everyone with a tertiary degree (equivalent to ISCED
level 5 or 6), and one that includes everyone who has a lower level
of educational attainment (ISCED level 1 through 4). Figure 2
shows labor force participation levels in Germany across age, sex,
and education for the year 2008, based on the European Labor
Force Survey, EU LFS [26]. The year was deliberately chosen to
avoid including the impact of the financial crisis. Labor force
participation is defined according to the definition of the ILO,
which means it includes the employed as well as the unemployed.
The labor force participation rate is defined as the sum of
employed and unemployed persons divided by the total number of
people in the respective age, sex, and education category. The
higher the level of education, the higher the level of labor force
participation, and the smaller the differences between men and
women. The total size of the German labor force was about 42.6
million in 2008, and one-quarter of the individuals in the labor
force had a tertiary degree. This share was slightly higher among
men than among women; or 27% and 23%, respectively.
The fact that economic activity levels not only show distinct
patterns by age and sex, but also by education, plays a crucial role
when it comes to assessing the potential impact of changes in the
size and structure of the labor force on economic growth. The
consequences of population aging are only to a certain degree
determined by a population’s age structure. Labor productivity is
not uniform, but varies along several dimensions, with one of them
being the educational attainment levels of workers [10]. It might
very well be the case that a smaller and older but – in terms of
human capital – better equipped and more productive labor force
can compensate for some of the expected declines in economic
growth [27,28]. However, it is not the goal of this exercise to
quantify these growth effects. Instead, we would like to show the
potential changes in the composition of the German labor force
that go beyond the usual projections by age and sex.
Before we can project the characteristics of the labor force in
terms of age, sex, and education, we need not only the
participation profiles along these three dimensions, but also the
corresponding population projections. Using the multi-state
cohort-component method, the German population was projected
from 2008 to 2053 [29]. The starting population distribution in
2008 was calculated from the EU LFS. The specifications for
future fertility, mortality, migration, and education transitions are
Figure 1. Population age distribution, Germany 2010 (left) and 2060 (right). Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2012).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.g001
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the same as those presented in [30]; with the only difference being
that the assumptions about the future development of fertility,
mortality, and migration have been updated using the 2011
Version of the World Population Prospects [23]. The education
transitions came from the GET (Global Education Trend)
scenario, which projected future transitions based on the
development of historical global patterns of educational expansion.
On the basis of these assumptions, our analysis showed that not
only will larger shares of the younger cohorts attain tertiary
education (33% of 25–29-year-olds in 2053, compared to 19% in
2008), but the share of the population with higher levels of
education will increase among the age groups 50 and older, as
better educated cohorts will replace cohorts with lower levels of
educational attainment (‘‘educational upgrading’’). This means
that the share of Germans aged 50 and older with a tertiary degree
was 21% in 2008, and is projected to be 34% in 2053.
Keeping the labor force participation profiles fixed at the levels
observed in 2008 and combining them with the education-specific
population projections leads to an absolute labor force size of 29.6
million in 2053, which represents a reduction of almost one-third
compared to 2008. This projected decline in the number of
economically active individuals in Germany, based purely on
changes in the demographic structure, has appeared in previous
research [31]. However, by including the educational dimension,
we can also offer some estimates regarding the educational
composition of the future labor force: the share of the labor force
with tertiary education was 25% in 2008, but it is projected to rise
to 33% in 2033, and to increase further to 41% in 2053 (compare
Table 1). Since participation is held constant, this change is solely
due to the changes in the composition of the German population
described above. Table 1 shows that this change is expected to
happen among all of the age groups, although to varying degrees.
Based on the observation of past trends in Germany and other
aging countries, increases in the labor force participation rates of
women and of people over age 50 are likely. In order to estimate
what the consequences of these anticipated future developments
would be, we calculated an additional scenario in which we
assumed that participation would, by 2053, reach the levels that
were observed in Sweden in 2008. Sweden is often cited as a role
model country when it comes to equality in economic activity
levels among men and women and to the labor force participation
of workers over age 50. For example, in 2008 the labor force
participation rate of 60–64-year-olds was 61% in Sweden, but only
36% in Germany.
Under the assumptions of this second scenario, we can see that
the total size of the labor force is still set to decline, but only to 33.7
million: this represents a reduction of 20%, rather than the
reduction of over 30% that is anticipated to occur in the constant
scenario. Since the total population of Germany is projected to
decline as well – from 83 million in 2008 to roughly 70 million in
2053– the support ratio will only decline significantly under the
first scenario: from 0.51 in 2008 to 0.42 in 2053. The support ratio
here is defined as the ratio of persons in the labor force to those not
in the labor force, including the population below age 15. Under
Figure 2. Labor force participation rates in Germany, by age, sex, and highest level of educational attainment, 2008. Source: EU LFS,
own calculations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.g002
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the assumption of Swedish participation rates, the support ratio in
2053 would still be 0.49. In terms of the educational composition
of the future labor force, the two scenarios show only very minor
differences.
Greener? – Demographic change and the environment
Demographic change has important consequences for the
environment and for carbon emissions. In the literature that dates
back to the IPAT equation [32], population size was the
demographic factor that received the most attention. More
recently, the study of the role of population composition has
become more prominent [33].
Population aging is a process that entails substantial changes in
the population age structure. It has been shown that the profile of
per capita CO2 emissions by age has an inverted-U shape [34]. As
individuals enter adulthood, they tend to consume and travel
more, which in turn leads to a higher level of emissions. This trend
continues well into adulthood, as older people have larger incomes
and larger houses and cars. Emissions then decline when
individuals retire and travel less. At an aggregate level, the
inverted-U profile of emissions over the life-cycle means that a
changing age structure may generate considerable reductions in
CO2 emissions, all else being constant.
Figure 3 shows the trend in emissions for Germany, obtained by
multiplying the age-specific per-capita profile in Zagheni [34] and
UN population projections [24]. The profile of emissions over the
life course is kept constant: changes in emissions are driven by
changes in population size and age structure. In our stylized
model, we assume that the relative age-profile of emissions for
Germany is qualitatively similar to the one of the US and other
developed countries. Under that assumption, we observe that
population aging initially tends to increase emissions as a growing
number of people pass through the ages at which emissions peak.
We expect that the effect of changing population size and age
structure may contribute to an increase in emissions of more than
30% over several decades, from 1950 to 2020. But in the long run,
as the proportion of people older than age 80 continues to increase
and the population size shrinks, emissions would decrease and
reach pre-1950 levels, under the assumption that the age-specific
behavioral contribution to emissions would not change.
The combined effects of a reduced population size and a more
favorable age structure (in terms of carbon emissions) are likely to
generate substantial reductions in CO2 emissions. These gains will
not happen in isolation. New lifestyles, increased levels of wealth,
and the development of new technologies will interact with the
changing demographic landscape. However, this is a case in which
population aging could be appropriately leveraged to transform a
challenge into an opportunity.
Richer? – Demographic change and intergenerational
transfers
The impact of population aging on intergenerational transfers
has been studied extensively (e.g., [35]). However, the effects of
demographic change on the size and timing of bequests over the
life course have not received as much attention.
The relationship between demography and bequests is complex,
and is mediated by a number of economic variables, like saving
rates and wealth accumulation. However, the demographic forces
that shape intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests are
relatively simple.
Increasing longevity and fertility postponement affect, in
opposite directions, the points in time over the life course when
people receive bequests. Increasing life expectancy means that, all
else being constant, people will experience the deaths of their
family members later in life. Thus, on average, individuals will
receive bequests later in life. Fertility postponement acts in the
opposite direction. Later childbearing means that, all else being
equal, people in the same age group will have, on average, older
parents and grandparents. In the US, life table calculations and
empirical evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) indicate that the rapid increase in the mean age at
childbearing has more than counteracted gains in life expectancy
in recent years [36].
Lower fertility means that bequests are shared among a smaller
group of people; thus the per capita amounts that individuals
receive should be larger. As fertility has reached below-replace-
ment levels, we expect that the per capita amounts of bequests
people receive will stabilize.
In order to gain insight into the relative importance of changes
in life expectancy and the postponement of childbearing in
Germany, we evaluated trends in the life expectancy at the mean
age at childbearing. This figure is a proxy for the number of years
a surviving woman would expect to live with her mother alive. It
can also be thought of as the average age at which a woman would
experience the death of her mother, conditional on the woman’s
survival. Trends in the age at the mother’s death can be seen as
indicative of general trends in the age at the receipt of bequests.
Figure 4 shows trends in female life expectancy at the mean age
at childbearing for Germany. Overall, the general trend indicates
that people inherit wealth, on average, at a later stage of their life
course. The general increase in life expectancy at the mean age at
childbearing seems to have stalled during the past decade, as
fertility postponement counteracted gains in life expectancy.
However, in the coming decades, we expect to see that the effect
of continued gains in life expectancy will prevail. Assuming that
people do not dis-save during retirement and that fertility remains
low, gains in life expectancy, coupled with the smaller size of
younger generations, may also translate into larger per capita
inheritance.





Overall (25+) 28% 46%
Source: Loichinger (2012), own calculations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.t001
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As the age at which people experience the death of a family
member is expected to increase over time, individuals will receive
bequests, on average, when they are older; i.e., after they have
established themselves professionally and are potentially close to
retirement. Bequests may thus act as a form of equalizer. The
family members who stand to benefit the most from the bequests–
albeit indirectly–could be the grandchildren, who may receive
financial help from their parents as they attend college or form a
family.
An increase in the age at which bequests are received is not
necessarily advantageous or disadvantageous. However, it can be
seen as an opportunity in an aging society. Appropriate policies
regarding inheritances could be designed to reduce inequality and
favor intergenerational transfers to those who are at a stage of their
life-cycle in which they require more resources.
Healthier? – Demographic change and healthy life
expectancy
The projected increases in longevity in the coming decades are
substantial. In Germany, life expectancy at birth for females will
rise from 83 years currently to around 90 years by 2050. In the
past, gains of roughly 2.5 years were added every 10 years. These
projected changes in longevity raise the question of whether the
lifetime added will be spent in good health. There are several
studies on current and past trends in health expectancies,
including disability-free and active life expectancy [37]. They
have shown improvements in health expectancies for Germany
and other developed countries as measured by different indicators
of limitations in the activities of daily living or of subjective health
perceptions [38–41]. However, other studies have found that these
gains in disability-free life expectancy have been accompanied by
an increase in the prevalence of chronic diseases [42,43].
Surprisingly, there are relatively few analyses of future health
expectancy trends in Germany. These trends are mainly
considered in studies on future expenditures on health care and
long-term care in aging welfare states [11,13,15,16]. Increasingly,
studies have found indications that long-term care expenditures
tend to be concentrated at the end of life, during the two years
prior to death [44,45]. This suggests that the increases in life
expectancy are not necessarily related to soaring health care costs.
However, the question remains if Germans enjoy not just longer
lives, but healthier lives as well. In an effort to answer this
question, we have forecasted age-and sex-specific trends in self-
perceived health and the care needs of household members.
The analysis is based on micro-level data collected in the
German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a
representative household panel study that reaches back to 1984,
and interviews all of the adult household members over age 17 on
an annual basis. In the first wave, 12,000 respondents were
interviewed. Subsets for foreigners, eastern Germans (in 1990),
and immigrants were added subsequently; and in 1998, 2006, and
2009, ‘‘refreshment’’ samples were included. The participating
households are followed over time. The SOEP contains informa-
tion about each individual respondent, including his or her
working history, income parameters, and household structure.
Detailed descriptions of the panel design and description of the
data have been provided elsewhere [33,36].
The SOEP data are organized into different datasets. For our
analysis, we matched the data elicited in individual-level
questionnaires with biographic data and health and disability
information. We chose the question ‘‘How would you describe
Figure 3. Relative change in CO2 emissions attributable to changes in population size and age structure affecting the sum of age-
specific consumption patterns, Germany, 1950–2100. Source: Zagheni (2011), UN population projections, own calculations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.g003
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your health at present?’’ as an indicator for self-perceived health
status; and the question ‘‘Is there anyone in your household who is
receiving care because of old age or health reasons?’’ as an
indicator for care need among the elderly members of the
household. This question reflects the general need of care among
older family members and spouses and, indirectly, at which ages
this need is expressed for the first time. The self-perceived health
question was asked between 1992 and 2011, and had five possible
answers: ‘‘very good’’, ‘‘good’’, ‘‘satisfactory’’, ‘‘poor’’ and ‘‘very
poor’’. We dichotomized this variable with the first three answers,
which meant that the respondent was healthy. The care question
was asked between 1984 and 2011, and had only two possible
answers: ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’. Unfortunately, the SOEP does not
contain information on elderly living in residential homes for the
period of observation. This leads to an underrepresentation of
individuals receiving care. However, we base our estimation on
onset of care need rather than the quantity of care needed. We
assume that the onset of care need does not necessarily differ
between individuals receiving care at home or in residences and
that family members may move to residences only when they
expect to need care. Moreover, spouses may care for each other at
home. We used this information to calculate the sex-specific mean
age at which good health/bad health and no need for care/need
for care was reported. In a second step, we forecasted these trends
using a random walk with drift.
Our results confirm the findings from the literature. Between
1984 and 2011, the average age at which need for care is reported
for the first time rose by 13 years, from 36 to 49 years, among
women. Assuming that the pace of improvement is similar in the
future, women could add another 19 years of life reaching 68
years, before they would need to care for a household member.
When we used self-rated health status as an indicator to project
healthy life expectancy, the numbers did not differ considerably.
In this case, we see immense improvements in healthy life
expectancy in recent decades. Over the entire observation period,
more than 25 years of life without any subjective health difficulties
are added (for the results compare Figure 5). The improvements
are less pronounced among women than they are among men, but
they are still large. This discrepancy may be partially caused by
men’s tendency to report better health than they objectively have
[46].
Figure 6 shows the results in relation to life expectancy. We
used data for Germany from the Human Mortality Database for
the years 1956 to 2011 and the Lee-Carter-Method to forecast
future life expectancy at birth [47]. Both of the indicators show a
significant increase in the share of the lifetime spent in good health
and with no care need. We estimate that the average man will
spend around 80% of his lifetime in good health in 2050,
compared to 63% today. The gap between men and women is
slightly bigger in this case due to the higher life expectancy among
women. In 2050, the share of the lifetime spent in good health is
expected to be seven percentage points lower among women than
it is among men. Still, the average woman in 2050 will likely spend
over 70% of her lifetime in good health, compared to less than
50% in the past and about 60% today. According to our estimates,
the onset of care need for spouses or elderly members of the
household will be pushed to higher ages. Based on the
development of care need since 1984, for the future our results
suggest that we will spend the majority of our life time without
someone in the household who needs care.
Figure 4. Estimates and projections of female life expectancy at the mean age at childbearing in Germany for the period 1950–
2060. Source: Own calculations using demographic rates from the UN World Population Prospects: the 2012 Revision.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.g004
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Life-cycle adjustments? – Demographic change and time
use
The ratio of market work, housework, and leisure over the life-
cycle and in cross-section is of increasing importance, both
between the sexes and across the life-cycle at the individual level.
As the population ages and the pressure for women to participate
in the labor force grows, this area is expected to undergo
significant changes, which will in turn have an impact on the
current generational and gender contract. We estimated and
studied monetary estimates of income, consumption, and inter-
generational transfers obtained by following the standard meth-
odology of the National Transfer Accounts. This process provided
us with age-specific economic variables which were also decom-
posed by gender. The theoretical framework was built upon
Samuelson [48], Diamond [49], and Lee [50]. Information about
consumption, income, and the age utilization of public expendi-
tures and revenues came from the database for Germany [51]. To
estimate production, consumption, and transfers in the household,
the Time Use Survey 2001/02 was employed. The observed
differences in time use by gender provide information about the
division of domestic work within households, and the overall
workload of an individual. While working hours in market
employment were found to be twice as high for men as they are
for women, the reverse was shown for domestic labor. Women
were found to perform two-thirds of the domestic services,
including general housekeeping tasks, childcare, elderly care, and
shopping (Table 2).
Market consumption and labor income, as well as the
corresponding difference between the two, or the life-cycle deficit,
show a not surprising pattern. We found that men tend to produce
twice as much labor income as women beginning in their thirties.
As the consumption levels were found to be relatively comparable,
the average woman was not shown to have a surplus over her life
course. This picture changes dramatically if we include unpaid
home production. For almost all of the items, such as cooking,
cleaning, or shopping, women have significantly higher values of
hours worked. Only from retirement age onward were men shown
to increasingly engage in cooking, cleaning, and gardening. We
used the specialist replacement method to monetize unpaid
housework according to the third-party rule [52], we use the
hourly wage of an unskilled worker for all easy household tasks.
When we combined market and unpaid home production by age
and gender, we found roughly similar life-cycle patterns of
consumption and income for both sexes. The monetized results
for the lifecycle deficit with and without household production and
consumption are shown in Table 3.
The relationship between leisure, market work, and housework
is expected to change in the future, assuming the currently
observed profiles continue, as is shown in Table 4. At the
population level, we found that the amount of time devoted to
home production is likely to exceed the time spent performing
market work. The amount of time spent on market work as a share
of the total time available was only 14.5% in 2010, and is expected
to decrease to 11.9% by 2060. The analysis showed that the share
of time spent in what we call leisure – i.e., activities other than
market work, home production, or sleeping – is set to increase
slightly over the study period among the older population. For the
average individual (in this synthetic cohort approach), we found
that the share of time spent working is projected to be 7.4%, while
the share of time spent in leisure activities is likely to account for
nearly half of the person’s lifetime. Thus, the aging of the
population will lead to an increase in leisure time, if no further
adjustments are made.
It would be interesting to estimate a scenario assuming
participation rates of Swedish men and women but time transfers
for Sweden are not yet available. Still, with a simple ten
percentage points increase in female labor force participation we
can assume the iso-work amount to stay constant. In response,
females could reduce hours in unpaid domestic labor. We find that
47 million hours of work would need to be redistributed on the
population level. About 30,000 individuals working on average 30
hours per week would be needed to close the gap. In case the
Figure 5. Projected average age until no care need is reported
by any elderly household member (left) and good self-
perceived health (right), men and women, Germany 1984–
2050. Source: GSOEP 1984–2011, own calculations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.g005
Figure 6. Share of lifetime spend with no care provision for any
elderly household member and good health, men and women,
Germany 1984–2050. Source: GSOEP 1984–2011, UN population
projection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.g006
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excess housework is split between household members each adult
had to increase weekly working hours by about 45 minutes.
Discussion
In this paper, we addressed the important question of how
selected areas of life will be affected as populations grow older and
smaller. We used the case of Germany, a country that is at a
relatively advanced stage of the demographic transition, to study
the potential long-run implications of population aging. In the
decades prior to 2040, the consequences of population aging are
expected to be largely negative, as the baby boomers reach
retirement age and dependency ratios and expenditures for
pensions and health care increase. Still, we found evidence that
after a period of transition, population aging could have effects
that are positive, at least in part.
We have shown the potential effects of having an older and
smaller population, such as lower carbon emission levels due to
changes in aggregate consumption patterns. Having a higher share
of the population with tertiary education could be beneficial for
economic growth in the long run, and could compensate, at least
in part, for absolute and relative declines in the number of
economically active persons. Inherited wealth will have to be split
among a smaller number of siblings, which could compensate for
an increase in upward public transfers, via pay-as-you-go pension
system. Furthermore, individuals are expected to spend longer
shares of their lives in good health and engage in leisure activities.
The results only take into account pure demographic changes,
as we chose to look at only the changes related to shifts in the
population composition, and their impact on different areas of
society. Given this limitation, we were unable to predict whether
behavioral changes will occur as individuals adapt to an older
population structure. We are aware that changing expectations
will alter today’s observed profiles.
The higher educational attainment at the population level can
be advantageous for economic growth. Whether this development,
through presumed increases in productivity, can compensate for
the negative long-run effects of the shrinking workforce remains to
be seen. The positive returns of education might be smaller in the
future, when larger shares of each cohort attain higher levels of
educational attainment than it is currently the case. The expected
reduction in the levels of carbon emissions due to population
decline could be even greater if more environmentally-friendly
technologies are adopted. On the other hand, emissions could also
stagnate, as shrinking populations might not be able to realize
significant CO2 reductions. For example, more individuals may be
living in smaller or single households that are not efficient in terms
of per capita energy use. The higher educational attainment could
also be disadvantageous for the level of CO2 emissions as
individuals with tertiary education tend to travel more. The
bequests received by future generations could be significantly
lower than our estimates if their parents plan for longer lives and
adapt to increasing longevity by using/depleting their capital
stock. Moreover, the projected increase in healthy life expectancy
is difficult to estimate. The question of whether the time spent in
intensive care will really be postponed to the last two years of life,
as some studies have proposed [45,53], remains open. Trends in
dementia, for example, are not entirely clear [54,55]. Further-
more, given the increases in the pension entitlement age in most
developed countries, the share of the lifetime spent working could
remain constant instead of declining.
Nevertheless, the results show that there are important areas in
which population aging and decline could be beneficial. Projecting
the behavioral changes in each of these areas is beyond the scope
of this article, but this is an obvious topic for future research.
Although the results presented refer to Germany, they could be of
interest for other regions around the world, including both
developed and developing countries. Life expectancy is increasing
almost universally, and the health status of the older population is
improving. The importance of investments in education is well
known, and education levels are increasing in the great majority of
countries. Depending on a country’s stage in the demographic
transition process, the results from the analyses of bequests and
CO2 emissions are also generalizable.
Table 2. Hours spent on housework per day by gender.
,30 30–65 65+
Men 1.3 2.8 3.7
Women 2.2 4.8 4.9
Source: Time Use Survey 2001/02, Germany.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.t002
Table 3. Market and non-market values for consumption, income, and corresponding lifecycle deficit in billion euros, Germany
2003.
Men Women Total
Consumption 725 781 1506
Income 814 429 1243
Market Lifecycle Deficit 89 2352 2263
Time adjusted consumption 1,131 1,202 2,333
Time adjusted income 1,124 946 2,070
Time adjusted lifecycle deficit 27 2256 2263
Source: own calculations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0108501.t003
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Some aspects of population aging are an inevitable consequence
of demographic change. In this article, we showed examples of
situations where population aging can lead to important oppor-
tunities for our societies. We believe that a continued discussion
about these issues between social scientists and policy makers will
be crucial to leverage the benefits of changing population
compositions.
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